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Abstract—In this paper we present an extension of the Preˆt a`
Voter e-voting system that introduces visual encryption to solve
the chain voting problem and ensures that no organisation sees
the layout of the ballot form prior to its use. The chain voting
problem in Preˆt a` Voter is that anyone who can see the ballot
prior to its use can coerce a voter by noting down the details
of the form and then requiring it to be used by the voter. This
solution is based on requiring the tellers to be active in ballot
creation.
Further benefits are the use of symmetric key encryption to
potentially provide higher cryptographic security, automatic and
mandatory well-formedness checks on the ballot forms used can
be performed and visual encryption also results in a solution to
the problem of enforced destruction of the candidate list.
Index Terms—Visual encryption, election integrity, ballot se-
crecy, receipts and coercion resistance, verifiability
I. INTRODUCTION
CHAUM [1] introduces an electronic voting scheme thatfundamentally uses visual cryptography to provide voter
verifiability. The vote is printed in plain text by the voting
machine but in two layers so that when these are separated
and one is discarded, what remains is a receipt that can
be decrypted into a vote that in turn can be counted. The
decryption is performed serially by a number of independent
trustees leading to an output that is verifiable but makes it
impossible to tie a vote to a voter.
Chaum et al [2] builds on this initial configuration by setting
the system up with ballot forms that are printed on normal
paper prior to the start of the election in what they call
Preˆt a` Voter. One main advantage of this system is that the
voting devices never learn the intention of the voter, leaving
a compromised device unable to change the vote based on its
contents. The system also adds further benefits of simplicity
and user recognition.
A. Voting in Preˆt a` Voter
The Preˆt a` Voter system uses printed ballot forms (example
in Figure 1) with a candidate list to the left, boxes in which
to indicate a choice on the right and an onion printed below
the boxes. The ordering of the candidate list is based on
randomness unique for each ballot form and encapsulated
cryptographically within the onion, so named because it has
many layers of encryption underneath each of which is found a
germ. The sum of the germs is the reordering of the candidate
list, thus requiring all layers of the onion to be peeled off
before the order can be reconstructed.
Fig. 1. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
When casting a vote the candidate list is detached and
discarded, leaving the receipt. This contains only the position
of the X (indicating the choice of the voter) and the onion.
The receipt is scanned in, stored and transmitted electronically.
The voter is allowed to take the receipt away.
In Preˆt a` Voter the ballot receipts, intermediate decryption
steps and the final plain-text votes are published on a secure,
publicly available web bulletin board, thus providing voter
verifiability. The onion can be used as search criterion to check
that the vote has been included in the tally by comparing the
receipt held with the one shown on the bulletin board.
B. Shortcomings of Preˆt a` Voter
Ryan and Peacock [3] analysed Preˆt a` Voter from a sys-
tems perspective and raised a number of concerns, the most
important being that voter anonymity can potentially be com-
promised by anyone who can see the ballot forms before they
are used. Anyone who can register the connection between a
particular onion and the ordering of the candidate list knows
the vote cast resulting in a receipt with that particular onion.
This opens up the possibility not only for a corrupt government
agency to register all votes (completely circumventing the
cryptographic steps) but also for chain voting or simple
coercion. For example, a coercer can note down the candidate
list ordering and the associated onion before marking his own
intention on the form and giving it to another person. If that
ballot form has been used to cast a vote then the onion will
appear on the web bulletin board and the coercer knows the
content of that vote.
In this paper we present an approach which reduces the
potential for identifying voting choices.
C. Three phases
An election has three phases: ballot creation phase (ballot
forms are created and distributed), election phase (ballots are
cast) and tallying phase (ballots are counted). The changes to
Preˆt a` Voter that we propose in this paper are concerned only
with the first two phases and the last phase remains unchanged.
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D. Contributions of this scheme
We acknowledge that the original Preˆt a` Voter paper [2] puts
forth that removing the visual encryption of the vote and using
ballot forms that voters recognise will increase simplicity as
well as user acceptance. However, in this paper we propose to
augment Preˆt a` Voter with a visual encryption of the candidate
list. This enables the creation of paper ballots where no one
organisation can learn the ordering of the candidate list. In our
proposed system the visual encryption of the candidate list is
achieved by going through a number of teller permutations in
the same way as the onion is composed in Preˆt a` Voter.
It is necessary to involve a number of tellers in this process
so that no single teller can learn the ordering of the candidate
list.
The main objective of introducing visual encryption is to
encapsulate the ordering of the candidate list in such a way
that no one can see it prior to the election but where it
can easily be decrypted by the individual voter whilst in the
booth. This removes the need for the destruction of the left-
side of the ballot form, containing the candidate list. This
mandatory destruction is one of the potential weaknesses of
the Pret a Voter system. The decryption must not be a difficult
task because every single voter must be able to perform the
decryption discussed in Section III.
Using visual encryption also means that a stronger sym-
metric key encryption can be used instead of asymmetric key
encryption, and that the tellers are employed in an oracle mode
[2], performing an automatic well-formedness check on the
onion during the casting of a vote.
E. Overview of this paper
The remainder of this paper is concerned with the changes
introduced into the ballot creation and election phases. The
visual encryption and transformations are described in detail
and illustrated with examples before future work is identified.
II. BALLOT CREATION PHASE
We propose that the ballot creation process is started by a
central organisation that creates an image of the candidate list
in the base ordering. This is then split into two layers, creating
a visual encryption of the list where both layers are needed to
render the list legible. This process can be done in the open
and publicly scrutinised. The image and the two layers can
even be published so that anyone wishing to verify them can
do so. Details of the visual encryption, or division into two
layers, is presented in Section V.
The creation of a ballot form is started by the submission
of the top layer to the first teller and this randomly chooses a
germ. This germ is used to reorder the encrypted candidate list
in the same way as previously done in [2], but it is also used
to perform a transformation of the candidate list image, as
described in Section V. The germ is encrypted into the onion
using a secret key held by the teller.
Performing these transformations to the top and bottom
layers separately result in valid top and bottom layers that
when brought together shows the candidate list in the new
ordering. It should be noted that the tellers must ensure that
Fig. 2. Visually encrypted ballot form
each part of the visual encryption is supplied strictly only
during each respective period, in order to guarantee that an
organisation cannot create a ballot form with known ordering,
nor that the ordering can be checked during the election.
III. ELECTION PHASE
The voter selects a ballot form (shown in Figure 2) from the
many supplied inside or outside the booth and places it on a
horizontal touch screen on the voting device. This prompts the
machine to read the barcode on the form and submit the onion
to the tellers. These return a visual encryption of the candidate
list but contrary to the process of creating the ballot forms, it is
now the bottom layer of the encryption that is returned. Note
that the top layer of the visual encryption, which is printed on
the ballot form, is never read in by the machine and so will
never co-exist on the same medium to compromise security.
When this layer of the visual candidate list encryption is
displayed on the touch screen underneath the ballot form, the
candidate list will appear in plain text for the voter to see
because both layers of the visual encryption have now been
brought together and are aligned. The details of this visual
encryption are explained later in this paper.
Revealing the candidate list indicates to the voter that the
onion is well formed, adding to the original Preˆt a` Voter
scheme by making it possible to test the well-formedness of
the actual form used to cast a vote. In the previous scheme, the
user had to assert him- or herself of the validity of the scheme
by testing the well-formedness of any number of preliminary
forms but could not test the form used to cast the vote because
this would enable the voting device (and the extended system)
to learn the intention of the voter. [2]
Before viewing the plain text ballot form, the voter must
perform some action1 to commit to using this to cast the
vote, ensuring that a voter cannot learn the ordering of the
list without that ballot form being taken out of circulation.
Failing to do this would enable an eligible voter to check the
candidate lists on any number of forms and use these to coerce
other voters.
The voter now indicates his or her choice by marking an
X within the box immediately to the right of the preferred
candidate’s name. This makes a mark on the paper of course,
producing the receipt in the original scheme [2], but also
replicates this mark on the screen below the paper. The voter
1This is an area of future study, see Section VI.
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Fig. 3. The two pixel symbols
Fig. 4. The three resulting pixel symbols
can check that the mark appears in the same box on the screen
as it does on the paper.
The vote is now submitted by the machine by storing or
transmitting the same data as in the original scheme, namely
the onion and the position of the X. The bottom layer of the
candidate list is thus discarded, rendering it impossible for a
third party to reassemble the parts.
A. A solution to the problem of forced destruction of the
candidate list
We have already noted that in the original Preˆt a` Voter
scheme it is absolutely essential that the voter destroys the left
hand side of the form, the candidate list, or at least detaches
it from the form and is given “dummy” candidate lists [3], so
that it is impossible to prove the contents of the vote. In this
scheme, because the candidate list is only visible in plain text
during the actual voting taking place in the voting booth, the
destruction of the candidate list does not have to be enforced.
IV. VISUAL ENCRYPTION
The visual encryption, or division of the image into two
layers, is the same as presented in [1], in turn derived from
[4]. It is based on the division of each plain image pixel into
four sub-pixels, each of which is one of two different pixel
symbols as shown in Figure 3.
If two of these pixel symbols are placed in different layers
they will yield one of three possible results, shown in Figure
4, when placed immediately above and below each other. The
resulting pixel symbol that is completely black is perceived
by the human eye as black and the two resulting symbols that
have white sub-pixels are perceived as white. Thus, the plain
image is in fact simply represented by white pixels on a black
background.
It is easy to see from Figure 4 that a white pixel in the plain
image is represented by the same pixel symbol in both layers;
it can be either symbol as long as they are the same in both
layers. The black pixel is similarly represented by different
symbols in the two layers, but which symbol is in which layer
is not dependent on the result (nor vice versa).
A. Mathematical notation of the visual encryption
A simple mathematical model for the visual encryption is
presented here to provide completeness.
The pixel symbols are represented by the integers 0 (white),
1 (white) and 2 (black) and thus in this representation the
following is true:
0 + 0 = 0 (1)
1 + 1 = 1 (2)
0 + 1 = 2 (3)
1 + 0 = 2 (4)
It is easy to see that we can use this system to calculate
the contents of the plaintext image when the two layers have
been overlaid. The first constituent is the top layer, the second
is the bottom and the resultant is the plain-text image.
B. Example of visual encryption
By the following example it should be more clear how the
visual encryption of the image of the candidate list is done. An
image of the list is created and shown in Figure 5. In simple
terms we start by creating a bottom, random layer where both
dimensions are twice those of the original image and the area
has been randomly filled with the pixel symbols in Figure 3,
resulting in the layer shown in Figure 10.
Because we randomise the visual contents of the bottom
layer, this means that the top layer will not be random but
dependent on the bottom. From a cryptoanalytic perspective
one might put forth that the fact that all the information is in
the top layer that is printed onto paper and thus no information
about the contents on a ballot paper can be derived from
the pixel symbols used in the bottom layer that is handled
electronically. This could be argued to enhance the security of
the system because the layer handled electronically stands a
slightly higher chance of being stolen.
We now create a representation of the original image,
expanding each pixel into one of the pixel result symbols in
Figure 4. For each pixel, if the current pixel is white then
the pixel symbol used in this representation must be the same
as the symbol in that particular place in the random bottom
layer. Otherwise the symbol is simply the completely black.
This complete representation can be found in the final image
in Figure 10.
From the complete representation of the image and the
random bottom layer we can create the top layer simply by
going through each pixel and checking which symbol is in
place in the complete representation. If that pixel is black then
the pixel used in this layer must be the opposite to the one
used in the bottom layer. Otherwise the pixel in the top layer
must be the same to that of the bottom layer. The resulting
top layer is shown in the middle image in Figure 10.
Thus, the superimposing of the top layer upon the bottom
layer is shown in the final image in Figure 10.
D. LUNDIN et al: DISTRIBUTED CREATION OF THE BALLOT FORM IN PREˆT A` VOTER 4
Fig. 5. The image of the candidate list
Fig. 6. Illustration of how the ballot form is split into smaller images
V. THE VISUAL TRANSFORMATIONS
The transformations applied to the layers by a teller do
not have to be reversible. In order to mitigate the buffering
problem described above, they do however have to be possible
to apply in any order and still yield the same result. One can
say that the scrambling of the image is performed in order to
mask the reordering at each stage.
A. Reordering of the list
The teller treats the image of the candidate list as a set of
vertically stacked smaller images (as shown in Figure 6), each
of which contains the name of one candidate. By reordering
these smaller images the teller also reorders the candidates,
though without knowing which image has within it the name
of which candidate. The basis for the reordering is of course
the germ selected by that same teller in the ballot creation
phase.
In this first instance the reordering of the candidate list is
based on cyclic shifts.
B. Scrambling of the image
Also based on the germ created by that teller, the teller
performs a scrambling of the image so that the reordering is
not apparent to a spectator. If the scrambling is not performed,
it is trivial to simply reorder the image of the base order list
until a match is found. The theory is also that if the same
transformations are applied to both layers, the final output will
be a different but still legible candidate list.
One requirement on the scrambling of the list is that the
transformations must be possible to apply in any order and
still yield the same result, that is to say that the top layer
should be possible to create in a forward teller order and the
bottom layer in a reverse teller order and still yield a legible
list.
To accomplish this the image is divided into a number of
smaller images along the vertical axis, one for each candidate.
The same scrambling is then applied to the same pixels of all
these smaller images. If the scrambling described in Section
V is applied to all these smaller images, it is evident that their
ordering in the larger image does not matter but the result is
the same.
C. Scrambling of the smaller images
The scrambling of each of the smaller vertical images is
simple. The teller uses its germ to create a map of the image
with a true or false value for each pixel. The pixel symbols in
the positions with a true value are switched to the respective
other symbol and those in positions with a false value are
simply left as they are.
If such scrambling is performed in the same manner to both
layers that make up the plain image, this yields the same plain
image as if no such scrambling had been performed. This is
because two of the same pixel symbol result in a white pixel
and two different pixel symbols result in a black. So if the
pixel symbols in both layers are switched to the corresponding
other symbol, the result will be the same.
D. Mathematical expression of the scrambling
The upper layer L2 and the bottom layer L1 are represented
by two two-dimensional arrays. From Section IV-A we know
that the two pixel symbols in these layers are represented by
the integers 0 and 1. Thus two examples of these layers are
L1 =
1 0 0 1 . . .
1
. . .
0
. . .
0
. . .
...
. . .
(5)
L2 =
0 1 1 1 . . .
1
. . .
1
. . .
1
. . .
...
. . .
(6)
The sum of these layers is thus
L0 =
2 2 2 1 . . .
1
. . .
2
. . .
2
. . .
...
. . .
(7)
Each teller that performs a transformation of the image creates
a two-dimensional array which is a map of the cells that will
be changed. The contents of this array is dependent on the
teller’s germ and some secret function. In the array, the integer
0 indicates that the pixel symbol will not be changed and the
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Layer contents Change Result
0 0 (no) 0
0 1 (yes) 1
1 0 (no) 1
1 1 (yes) 0
TABLE I
PIXEL SYMBOLS THAT ARE CHANGED AND THE RESULTS
integer 1 indicates that the pixel symbol will be changed to
the other. The following is an example of such an array:
F =
1 0 0 1 . . .
1
. . .
0
. . .
1
. . .
...
. . .
(8)
The changes that are performed are shown in Table I and
we can see from it that the resulting pixel symbol in the layer
is determined by the XOR function. We can annotate this in
the following way where G(x, y) is the layer being modified,
F (x, y) is the modifier and R(x, y) is the resulting layer:
R(x, y) = G(x, y)⊕ F (x, y) (9)
The following two arrays are (5) and (6) with (8) applied
to them:
L′1 =
0 0 0 0 . . .
0
. . .
0
. . .
1
. . .
...
. . .
(10)
L′2 =
1 1 1 0 . . .
0
. . .
1
. . .
0
. . .
...
. . .
(11)
We now add together layers L′1 and L
′
2 and form the following
resulting image:
L′0 =
2 2 2 0 . . .
0
. . .
2
. . .
2
. . .
...
. . .
(12)
Because the integers 0 and 1 are used to represent the “white”
pixels, we find that those pixels are found in the same positions
in (7) and (12). We can thus deduce that we have altered the
contents of the layers L1 and L2 but the resulting layers L′1
and L′2 still yield the same visual contents to the human eye.
Fig. 7. The result of the scrambling
Fig. 8. Teller communication order
E. Example of scrambling of the image
A Java application has been written to perform the visual
encryption of the image described earlier and the manipula-
tions used in this section as examples of how the scrambling
might work. The application takes an image such as Figure 5,
encrypts it by splitting it into two layers and then allows the
user to perform any number of manipulations as described in
this section, saving the results to files. Figure 9 shows the top
and the bottom layer going through reordering and scrambling
with the same seeds but in different order. Figure 7 shows
the final top layer superimposed upon the final bottom layer
— displaying the candidate list in the legible form only ever
occurring within the voting booth.
F. Election phase visual well-formedness check
When the voter places the ballot form on the voting machine
the onion is electronically read and sent to the tellers, in
reverse order to the ballot form creation phase, as illustrated
in Figure 8. The first teller to receive the onion removes its
layer of encryption from the onion and extracts its germ. It
then takes the bottom layer of the original visual encryption
of the candidate list and using the germ it then reorders the
candidate list and performs the transformations described in
Section V.
When all tellers have performed this decryption, reordering
and transformation in order the result is passed to the voting
machine where it is displayed on a screen underneath the
printed copy of the top layer, yielding a legible candidate list.
G. The buffering problem
This problem applies to a trivial implementation of visual
encryption through the tellers. Although none of the tellers are
able to make out the plaintext candidate list either during the
ballot creation phase OR the election phase, they would be
able to buffer their images of the top and the bottom layers
to apply them to the ballot form during the counting phase
succeeding the election phase. This problem would not occur
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Fig. 9. The scrambling of the visual encryption
Fig. 10. Top layer, bottom layer and both overlain
in the original Preˆt a` Voter scheme [2] because all the tellers
see is the receipt - they never get any sight of the candidate
list so they cannot learn the contents of the vote.
It is thus important to ensure that the visual encryption does
not lead to the tellers being able to learn the contents of the
vote.
H. Natural mitigation of the buffering problem by reverse
teller order
The proposed transformations in Section V are associative
and commutative. In other words, they can be applied in any
order to the image and as long as all transformations are
applied, the result is the same. This means that when the first
teller removes the top layer of encryption and extracts its germ
it can immediately apply the re-ordering of the list and the
transformation of the image. In other words, the processing of
the bottom layer does not have to be done in the same order
as the top. This results in none of the tellers seeing the same
transformations applied to both layers, seemingly solving the
buffering problem.
However, the weakness of the current scheme presented here
is that the first and the last teller can collude. The weakness
is that the last teller saves a copy of the top layer when it
has gone through the transformations of all tellers. During
the election phase when the bottom layer is created, the first
teller will see the bottom layer after it has gone through the
transformations of all tellers. If the two tellers work together
they can create an image of the candidate list as it is shown
to the voter in the booth. In the example shown in Table II a,
b, c, d and e are transformations performed by tellers 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5 respectively.
Table II shows how the tellers start by processing the top
layer of the encrypted candidate list in steps 1 to 5. They then
perform the same transformations on the bottom layer in steps
6-10. As the transformations can be applied in any order, it
is easily deduced that the knowledge of T5 after step 5 and
that of T1 after step 10 can be combined to create a plain-text
version of the ballot form, the exact image shown to the voter
in the voting booth.
Overcoming this weakness is one focus of future work, see
Section VI.
VI. FUTURE WORK
Outstanding issues related to addressing whether the visual
encryption approach is implementable in a real setting are
currently under investigation, and we discuss them briefly here.
A. Prototype
As part of current research at the University of Surrey, a
prototype of the contribution made by this paper to the Preˆt
a` Voter scheme is currently being created. It will demonstrate
the three entities involved: the candidate list creation agency,
the teller(s) and the voting booth.
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Step: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Teller: T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T5 T4 T3 T2 T1
Top layer a a a a a
b b b b
c c c
d d
e
Bottom layer e e e e e
d d d d
c c c
b b
a
TABLE II
EXAMPLE OF SUM OF TELLER TRANSFORMATIONS
B. Teller tasks
The security of this scheme is based on the contents of
the candidate list being hidden from the tellers even though
these have to perform actions on a visual encryption of it. One
potential source of weakness is the fact that the tellers have to
perform all of three things: the creation of the ballot form, the
creation of the bottom layer to be displayed in voting booths
and the final tally. Because the ballot creation is done in a
forward teller order and the creation of the bottom layer in a
backward teller order, none of the tellers can reconstruct the
candidate list alone. However, if the first and the last teller
work together they can construct an image of the candidate
list.
C. The correct layer at the correct time
To ensure the secrecy of the election it is important that
the three phases of the election are recognised and enforced
by all parties. It is essential that the correct layer is fed into
the tellers at the right time, i.e. that the top layer that is to
be printed onto the ballot forms is processed only during the
ballot creation phase and that the bottom layer that is displayed
in the voting booth only is processed during the actual voting
phase — to ensure that no-one is able to check the ordering of
the candidate list in advance. This must somehow be enforced.
It might already be implicitly enforced by the mechanisms of
this scheme, but this must be proven.
D. Committing to using a ballot form
It is essential that a ballot form that is displayed on a voting
device must be immediately used or discarded: if this does not
happen then it is possible for a voter to check the contents of
a ballot form and then use this information to coerce another
voter. A question that remains to be answered is this: how
can this be enforced? If, for example, a further government
agency is introduced into the system, in effect to “tick” the
ballot forms used, then this agency could very easily remove
unwanted votes from the final tally. Furthermore, the tellers
cannot themselves identify a receipt that they are currently
decrypting and thus cannot enforce this. Perhaps introducing
databases in the tellers and embedding identification tags
within the onion will enable these checks to be carried out —
but this in turn will also lead to potential security problems.
This might be one of the most challenging issues.
E. Onion uniqueness
In Preˆt a` Voter a central agency creates the onion and can
thus ensure that no two ballot forms are identified by the same
onion. In this distributed example, some method must be put
in place to impose similar restrictions so that a voter can find
his or her receipt on the web bulletin board.
F. Aligning ballot form on machine
There are a host of physical considerations to be addressed,
for example to make the aligning of the two layers easy and
accurate for the voter in the booth. A series of perforations of
the ballot form that correspond to protruding elements on the
voting machine might aid in this.
VII. SUMMARY
By using visual encryption on the candidate list it is
shown here how it is possible to create ballot forms that no
organisation, in creation or transit, has seen, solving the chain
voting problem discussed in [3].
In this scheme the tellers are involved in the creation of the
onion and can therefore use stronger symmetric key encryption
instead of asymmetric key encryption.
Furthermore, it follows of this configuration that each ballot
form used to cast a vote is checked for well-formedness. In
the case where it is not well formed, the voter will simply not
see the candidate list and the ballot form is useless.
The system also solves the problem of forcing the destruc-
tion of the candidate list because the list is simply not legible
outside the booth.
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